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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
In the Interest of 
S.O., J.O., and C.K. 
Children under the age of : 
eighteen years. 
: Case No. 981207-CA 
Val Newman and Ruth Kofod, : 
Petitioners, : 
v. : 
Honorable Charles D. Behrens : Priority 4 
State of Utah, Division of 
Child and Family Services, : 
Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (c) (Supp. 1998). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether petitioners were entitled to a shelter 
hearing despite the fact that there had been no "removal" as 
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-306 (Supp. 1997) . 
Standard of Review: 
Issues concerning statutory construction are questions 
of law which are reviewed for correctness granting no deference 
to the trial court. State v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 P.2d 
690, 691-92 (Utah App. 1994). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Whether petitioners were granted due process 
sufficient to safeguard their limited interest in this minor 
child. 
Standard of review: 
Constitutional questions are questions of law reviewed 
for correctness with no deference given to the trial court. 
State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 632 (Utah 1997). 
STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. Juvenile Court Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-101 to -
914 (Supp. 1997). 
2. Termination of Parental Rights Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-401 to -414 (Supp. 1997). 
(Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 7, 1996, two minor children, S.O. and 
J.O., were taken into protective custody by the Division of Child 
and Family Services (DCFS). The Division filed a petition 
alleging abuse and neglect of the two children. Subsequently, 
another sibling, C.K., was added to the petition as a child at-
risk. On October 16, 1996, the juvenile court adjudicated the 
petition, and deprived the mother of custody of all three 
children. S.O. and J.O. were placed in the Division's custody; 
C.K. was placed in the temporary custody and guardianship of 
relatives, the Kofods. The juvenile court later modified its 
order and placed C.K. in the custody of Val Newman, another 
relative. 
2 
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On September 4, 1997, the Division filed a Motion 
requesting a review hearing with regard to C.K. to determine if 
it was in the best interests of the child to remain in the 
temporary custody of Val Newman in light of allegations that 
C.K.'s biological parents were residing in Ms. Newman's home. 
(R. 74-75; Addendum B). The motion was heard on October 24, 
1997. The court determined that it was not in C.K.'s best 
interests to remain in Newman's home and ordered that the child 
be placed into DCFS custody. (R. 145-47; Addendum C). Newman 
filed a Motion to Restore Custody on November 14, 1997 (R. 133-
34; Addendum D), but on February 13, 1998 the juvenile court 
again found it was not in C.K.'s best interests to return to 
Newman's home. (R. 218-22; Addendum E). 
Ruth Kofod, C.K.'s paternal grandmother, and Val Newman 
filed a Motion to Intervene, a Petition for Extraordinary Relief, 
and a Motion for Stay of proceedings on April 13, 1998. (R. 228-
41, 279-81, 284-85; Addendum F). Petitioners have recently 
petitioned again for restoration of custody of C.K., and a 
hearing is set before the juvenile court on October 5, 1998. 
(Addendum G). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Chastity Ortiz is the mother of three children, S.O. 
(dob 2/28/92), J.O. (dob 4/23/93), and C.K. (dob 4/8/96). (R. 
47). C.K.'s father is John Kofod. (R. 48). The fathers of 
S.O. and J.O. are not at issue in this proceeding. 
3 
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On September 7, 1996, S.O. and J.O. were placed into 
the protective custody of the Division of Child and Family 
Services based upon physical abuse allegations. (R. 1, 27). 
Following a shelter hearing, DCFS was awarded custody and 
guardianship of the two children. (R. 11-12, 17-21) . DCFS 
subsequently learned that the mother had another child, C.K., a 
five-month old infant, whom she had previously placed with the 
child's paternal grandparents. On October 10, 1996, the State 
moved to amend its petition to include C.K. (R. 34-35). A 
second amended petition was filed on October 16, 1996. (R. 41-
44) . 
At the adjudication hearing on the State's petition, 
the mother admitted to the allegations of the State's second 
amended petition. Based upon the admissions, the juvenile court 
found all three children to be neglected children, and concluded 
it had jurisdiction over the parties. (R. 46-50). As part of its 
dispositional order, the court ordered (1) S.O. and J.O. placed 
in DCFS custody and guardianship, (2) C.K. placed in the 
temporary custody and guardianship of Ruth and John Kofod 
(paternal grandparents) with DCFS providing protective 
supervision services, and (3) DCFS to implement reunification 
services to the mother with a return home goal for all the 
children. The court also ordered, with regard to all three 
children, that "unless restricted by the terms of this or further 
order, the Division of Family Services shall have the authority 
4 
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and responsibility as provided by law to determine where and with 
whom the children shall live." (R. 46-50, 52-53). 
In March 1997, the court's order that C.K. be placed in 
the temporary custody and guardianship with the Kofods was 
modified to provide that because the grandparents were divorcing 
custody/guardianship would be maintained by Ruth Kofod only. (R. 
64-66). In April 1997, the order was further modif ied,#> upon 
motion by the State, and temporary custody/guardianship was given 
to Val (Kofod) Newman, C.K.'s paternal aunt, under an order of 
DCFS protective supervision. The Kofods had been residing in the 
Newman home with C.K. for number of months and it was felt to be 
in her best interests to remain there. (R. 67-69). 
In October 1997, the juvenile court held a permanency 
review hearing pursuant to section 78-3a-312. The court also 
concurrently considered the State's Motion to Review Placement of 
C.K., pursuant to section 78-3a-307 (6) . Said motion was filed 
upon DCFS learning that Newman was allowing the natural parents 
to reside in her home. Newman was sent a copy of the motion, was 
given notice of the hearing and appeared for the hearing as 
reflected in the court's order.1 (R. 72-75, 94-96). 
At the October 1997 hearing, the court determined the 
parents had failed to substantially comply with the DCFS service 
plans, that the children were at risk to return to the parents, 
2The consolidated hearing was continued from the September 
18th date based upon objections unrelated to the current matter, 
and was again continued upon motion by the parents' counsel. The 
hearing ultimately was held on October 24, 1997. (R. 97-101, 
132) . 
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that services and visitation be terminated, and that the goal 
should be changed to adoption. Regarding the State's motion to 
review C.K.'s placement, the court found it was in the best 
interest of C.K. to be removed from the kinship placement with 
Val Newman, and placed into DCFS custody/guardianship. The court 
also ordered that Newman would have 3 0 days to come forward with 
counsel to address the issue further, and that if she failed to 
come forward, C.K.'s placement would become an adoptive 
placement. (R. 145-47). 
On November 14, 1997, a typed letter from Newman was 
filed with the court. The letter asked for custody of C.K. (R. 
133-34) and was treated by the court as a Motion to Restore 
Custody at a hearing on December 30, 1997. Again Newman and Mrs. 
Kofod were advised to obtain counsel, and the hearing was' 
continued to February 13, 1998. (R. 204-205). 
On February 13, 1998, Newman and her counsel appeared 
at a hearing to further consider C.K.'s placement. Newman's 
counsel argued the juvenile court should hold a shelter hearing 
regarding C.K.'s removal from his client's home. The court found 
that, under section 78-3a-307(5) and (6), the statutes governing 
kinship placements, a shelter hearing is not required. Counsel 
for the parties presented further argument on whether it would be 
safe for C.K. to return to Newman's home, but did not put on 
evidence or request an evidentiary hearing. The court then found 
it would not be in C.K.'s best interest to return to the Newman 
home. (R. 218-22). Neither Newman or Kofod appealed this order. 
6 
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The State petitioned to terminate the parents' rights 
to the three children (R. 165-73), and trial was scheduled for 
April 20-21, 1998. On April 21, 1998, C.K.'s parents voluntarily 
relinquished their parental rights.~ 
Just prior to the relinquishment, on April 13, 1998, 
Val Newman and Ruth Kofod filed a Motion to Intervene, a Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief, and a Motion for Stay of proceedings. 
(R. 228-41, 279-81, 284-85) . Petitioners have since filed a 
Petition to Restore Custody with the juvenile court, seeking 
restoration of custody of C.K., which is set for hearing on 
October 5, 1998. (Addendum G). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioners argue that the juvenile court erred when it 
denied their request for a shelter hearing. This argument 
misconstrues the purpose of a shelter hearing. A shelter hearing 
is only required when the State of Utah exercises the police 
power of the state and removes a child from the custody of his 
parent or guardian without prior judicial approval. Under such 
circumstances, a shelter hearing is required to provide immediate 
judicial review to assure that the state's actions were proper. 
In the present case, there was no independent state action and 
thus no "removal" as contemplated by the shelter hearing statute. 
What occurred in this case was that the court 
determined, pursuant to a statutory requirement, that the 
2This order is not part of the appellate record, but was 
attached to the State's initial response to this Petition. 
7 
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temporary kinship placement which it had previously ordered was 
no longer appropriate. Thus there was no "removal" as 
contemplated by the shelter hearing statute. Rather it is a 
lawful and proper exercise of judicial authority. The fact that 
petitioners disagree with the court and feel aggrieved does not, 
in and of itself, constitute error. 
Petitioners also seem to believe that legal custody and 
guardianship over a child is fully and freely transferable as it 
would be over a mere chattel. Their arguments presuppose that 
when there exists an unbroken chain of familial guardians, the 
rights of the last relate back and fully encompass the rights of 
the natural parents. This argument is legally and morally 
indefensible. The purpose of the Child Welfare Reform Act is to 
provide safety and permanency for abused and neglected children. 
Allowing relatives to assert squatters rights in minor children 
through adverse possession in contradiction to the best interests 
of the child does not further these goals. 
Finally, even assuming that petitioners possess, either 
jointly or severally, some legally cognizable interest in the 
child, that interest was fully considered by the juvenile court. 
The court went out of its way to assure that petitioners were 
given ample opportunity to present evidence on their own behalf. 
Petitioners participated in numerous hearings over the course of 
more than four months including two evidentiary hearings. This 
is far more than is even contemplated by our caselaw. 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUVENILE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A 
SHELTER HEARING PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-3a-306 
Petitioners' claim of error is that the juvenile court 
was required to conduct a shelter hearing when it transferred 
custody of C.K. to DCFS. This argument is incorrect based upon 
the very statute upon which they rely. 
The statute clearly states under what circumstances a 
shelter hearing must be held. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-306 (1) 
reads, in pertinent part: 
With regard to a child who has been removed 
by the Division of Child and Family Services, 
or who is in the protective custody of the 
division, a shelter hearing shall be held 
within 72 hours after removal of the child 
from his home . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-306(l) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). 
C.K. was never "removed" from anyone's home by DCFS, nor was she 
ever in DCFS's protective custody. Protective custody is defined 
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(2)(b) as "shelter of a minor by the 
Division of Child and Family Services from the time the minor is ^ 
removed from the home until the shelter hearing." In the instant 
case, C.K. was placed in the temporary custody and guardianship 
of the Kofods by order of the juvenile court, not through 
physical removal by the state. The Court modified this original 
order on several occasions, the last of which resulted in 
temporary custody and guardianship being placed with DCFS. 
9 
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There is only one reason to convene a shelter hearing, 
and that is to review the state's independent exercise of its 
police power for reasonableness. The shelter hearing thus 
constitutes a judicial check upon the unbridled power of the 
state. It is not designed to be some sort of catch-all due 
process hearing. See generally State ex rel. M.V., 937 P.2d 
1049, 1050-51 (Utah App. 1997) (noting that shelter hearing is an 
interim order, not a final appealable order, and that only 
purpose of shelter hearing is to determine reasonableness of 
removal and need for continued removal). 
In support of their alleged right to a shelter hearing, 
petitioners argue that the only way the juvenile court could have 
placed C.K. in a kinship placement is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-307(5)(a), which requires a shelter hearing. This 
argument is incorrect. The juvenile court may make temporary 
orders of custody upon the filing of a petition, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-109 (5) , and specifically may make a relative placement 
after adjudication of a petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3a-118(2)(b).3 
Accordingly, the juvenile court had full authority to 
enter temporary orders of custody with relatives as it saw fit 
3
 It is worth noting that petitioners' reliance upon Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-307 is somewhat of a double-edged sword. Under 
section 78-3a-307(6) , it is the juvenile court's express 
obligation to review the placement to assure that it remains in 
the child's best interests. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-307(6) 
(Supp. 1997) . Significantly, the juvenile court believed it was 
reviewing the placement under -307(6) when it transferred custody 
to DCFS. See Addenda C and E. 
10 
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and to modify those orders as was in the best interests of the 
minor child. No shelter hearing was required because there was 
no unilateral state action involved necessitating that type of 
judicial review contemplated by the shelter hearing statute. 
II. PETITIONERS DO NOT POSSESS THE LEGAL 
RIGHTS OF A BIOLOGICAL PARENT OR FULL LEGAL 
GUARDIAN. 
The essence of petitioners' argument is that they were 
entitled to some sort of due process before being deprived of 
their legally cognizable interest(s) in C.K. This assertion may 
be accurate to some extent, however, in order to determine what 
sort of process was due petitioners, it is necessary to first 
determine what sort of legally cognizable interest they actually 
possess in this child, and then to see if the juvenile court gave 
them due process commensurate with that interest. See Summers v. 
Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1980).4 
Petitioners believe that they are entitled to the full 
legal protections such as would be granted to a biological or 
adoptive parent or full legal guardian. This is incorrect given 
the facts of this case. 
4
 In Wulffenstein, the Supreme Court described a relative's 
interest in the custody and welfare of a child as a liberty 
interest, id. However, the Court did not determine the precise 
level of due process required but merely determined that the 
hearings in the juvenile court had been sufficient in that case. 
Id. 
11 
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At the time these proceedings in the juvenile court 
were initiated, petitioners had only physical custody of C.K.~ 
It is clear that they did not have legal custody because the 
neglect petitions were prosecuted against the child's biological 
parents. Had petitioners been the legal guardians, the petitions 
would have been directed against them. 
Petitioners also make much of the fact that only S.O. 
and J.O., C.K.'s siblings, were actually removed by the state at 
the commencement of this action. Whether or not C.K. was 
"removed" along with her siblings at the inception of this action 
is irrelevant. 
Juvenile Court proceedings are commenced through the 
filing of a petition. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-305. When a child 
is removed by DCFS, this petition must be filed on or before the 
date of the shelter hearing. Ld. This does not mean, however, 
that proceedings in the juvenile court can only be initiated 
through the removal of a child, nor that any time the juvenile 
court orders placement of a child a shelter hearing must be held. 
The petition filed in this case alleged that the 
juvenile court had jurisdiction over all three children. This 
petition was found to be true and correct. Accordingly, the 
D
 While it is possible for a parent to legally delegate 
custody and guardianship over a child to another person, there is 
no evidence that this was done in this case. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-5-103 (Supp. 1997). Nor were there any prior district or 
juvenile court orders transferring custody. Cf. State ex rel. 
T.S., 927 P.2d 1124, 1126-27 (Utah App. 1996) (affirming order of. 
juvenile court that "court constituted" custodian enjoys no 
residual legal rights comparable to those of a parent). 
12 
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juvenile court properly assumed jurisdiction over all three 
children, and thus was entitled to enter any appropriate 
dispositional orders as it deemed just and proper. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-118 (Supp. 1997) (enumerating various possible 
dispositions). 
Pursuant to this authority, the court placed C.K. in 
the temporary custody and guardianship of the Kofods. (R. 52). 
At this point, the Kofods, for the first time, were given 
temporary legal custody of C.K. by the juvenile court. 
Subsequently, this custody was transferred to Ms. Kofod 
alone, and then to Ms. Newman. It is important to note that all 
of these transfers were accomplished pursuant to the court's 
jurisdiction over C.K. No person objected to any of these 
orders, and in fact, it appears that all parties were 
substantially in agreement with these modifications up until the 
point that custody was transferred to DCFS. 
The critical distinction to be noted in this sequence 
of events is that all orders of the juvenile court, with the 
exception of orders terminating parental rights or expressly 
granting permanent custody and guardianship, are legally 
temporary. See State ex rel. T.H. v. R.H., 860 P.2d 370, 374 
(Utah App. 1993) . Accordingly, petitioners were never the full 
legal custodians or guardians of C.K. as they allege, but rather 
had temporary custody and guardianship, as granted by the 
juvenile court, and subject to its review and/or modification. 
13 
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The final important question to be answered is just 
whose rights are implicated in this appeal. Petitioners have 
appealed collectively as relatives but it is far from clear that 
this is proper. The Kofods never objected to the juvenile court 
transferring temporary custody to Ms. Newman. They should not 
now be entitled to come forward and join in Ms. Newman's claim at 
this late date.e 
Essentially the argument of petitioners seems to be 
that they, jointly and severally, have had a continuous chain of 
custody over the child resulting in a legally cognizable 
interest. This argument presumes that a child is legally akin to 
a chattel in that a continuous chain of physical possession 
within a family connotes a legally recognizable property 
interest. This argument is legally wrong and morally repugnant. 
Allowing a group of relatives to assert squatters 
rights in a child by virtue of a period of adverse possession is 
inconsistent with the best interests of the child. Custody 
proceedings involving minor children have always been conditioned 
upon the notion that the best interests of the child are of 
paramount concern. E.g., Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 
(Utah 1982). Moreover, the entire Child Welfare Reform Act is 
specifically designed to assure that the child's best interests 
6
 It is also possible, as argued by the Guardian Ad Litem, 
that both the Kofods and Ms. Newman have waived their right to 
challenge the juvenile court's transfers of custody by failing to 
pursue timely appeals of those orders. See State ex rel. T.S., 
927 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Utah App. 1996) (holding where grandmother . 
failed to appeal deprivation of custody she waived her right to 
challenge that order. 
14 
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are served. State ex rel. M.C., 940 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah App. 
1997) (noting that child's welfare and best interests are 
paramount under the Act). 
To this end, the Act and the juvenile court both strive 
to balance the rights of parents with the rights of children. 
Kinship placements fit into this scheme as a potentially 
appropriate temporary placement while parents seek to remedy 
their deficiencies. Kinship placements are often considered to 
be preferable to foster placements because relatives may have an 
established relationship with the children and generally can be 
presumed to have the child's best interests in mind. In some 
cases kinship placements even become permanent placements when a 
parent is unable or unwilling to care for a child. 
However, this is not true in every case and it may 
change during the pendency of a particular case. The critical 
factor is that mere consanguinity, standing alone, does not 
guarantee that a relative will or should be chosen as a placement 
unless that relative is appropriate. Furthermore, the fact that 
a relative may initially be found appropriate does not mean that 
the relative will remain appropriate. That is what occurred in 
this case. 
The juvenile court found that Ms. Newman was no longer 
appropriate because she had been allowing improper contact with 
the mother.7 A relative's ability to protect a child from a 
Ms. Newman was well aware of this requirement as evidenced 
by the service plan which she signed. (R. 90-92). 
15 
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neglectful or abusive parent is a critical factor in assessing 
the appropriateness of any kinship placement. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-307(5)(b)(ii)(A through F) (Supp. 1997) (listing factors 
to be considered by the court in determining the appropriateness 
of a kinship placement). Relatives often have such dual 
loyalties to both the offending parent and the child. This 
creates a conflict which can place the child at risk for 
continued abuse or neglect, particularly in a case were parental 
rights have been terminated. 
The end results is that relatives have no absolute 
inviolable right to custody, but rather must be considered on a 
case by case basis. See Wilson v. Family Servs. Div., 554 P.2d 
227, 230 (Utah 1976) (noting only parents have actual vested 
interest in custody cognizable by the law, relatives have" only 
"dormant or inchoate right or interest"). Under Wilson, 
relatives have only a very limited right to be considered as a 
placement, if it is in the child's best interests, and the right 
to be heard with respect to their opinion as to the child's best 
interests." Because the juvenile court appropriately considered 
petitioners' limited rights in this case, their petition must 
fail. 
8
 Petitioners point to the procedural protections afforded 
foster parents pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-315 as support 
for their right to due process. However, the rights of foster 
parents are not analogous to the rights of relatives. Foster 
parents are employed by the State of Utah as independent 
contractors. As such, they have a clear financial, as well as 
emotional, interest in the children in their custody. This is a 
markedly different interest than that of a relative which makes 
it inappropriate to compare the two. 
16 
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III. THE JUVENILE COURT AFFORDED PETITIONERS 
DUE PROCESS IN EXCESS OF THAT WHICH WOULD BE 
SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT THEIR LIMITED INTEREST 
IN THESE MINOR CHILDREN. 
Because petitioners are not parents or legal guardians 
of these children, their only legally recognizable interest in 
the children is that identified by our Supreme Court in Wilson. 
Id. The biological parents' parental rights having been 
terminated, no party to these proceedings has any presumptive 
right to custody of the children. Accordingly, the operative 
principle involved is the best interests of the children. Under 
Wilson, petitioners' only right is to a hearing and the 
opportunity to be heard on the question of the children's best 
interests. Id. 
This happened on several occasions during the cfturse of 
the proceedings below.9 Val Newman was notified that the state 
was seeking review of the court's placement of C.K. with her on 
account of her allowing the biological parents to reside in her 
home. (R. 74-75; Addendum B). Petitioners were present and 
participated in the October 24, 1997 hearing wherein the children 
were ordered placed with DCFS. The Court gave them thirty days 
to register any objections and to ask for another hearing. 
9
 It is important to note that petitioners have not provided 
this Court with the transcripts of the hearings held in the 
juvenile court. Despite this omission, petitioners attempt to 
cast doubt upon the fairness of these hearings. Because there is 
nothing in the record provided which supports such speculation 
and because petitioners have not provided an adequate record, 
this Court should presume the regularity of the proceedings held 
in this case. E.g., State ex rel. J.M., 940 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
17 
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Their only response was to file a handwritten note 
requesting that the children be returned. The juvenile court, 
quite generously, construed this note as a motion for return of 
custody and set the matter for a hearing. Petitioners also 
participated in several reviews prior to the hearing on their 
"motion" which was held in February of 1998. However, in their 
brief, petitioners allege that they had no knowledge of the 
allegations upon which the state based its alleged "removal" of 
the children. This argument is patently absurd. 
Petitioners have been intimately involved in this 
matter from its inception. They have been present at virtually 
every hearing held. The juvenile court went out of its way to 
assure that petitioners had every opportunity to present their 
side of the case. Petitioners did not avail themselves of any of 
these opportunities.1^ It is hard to understand how convening a 
shelter hearing at this late stage would serve any purpose given 
the amount of time that has already been spent listening to 
petitioners' complaints. Because petitioners have already 
received all the due process to which they are entitled, the 
state requests that their petition be dismissed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT; PUBLICATION OF OPINION 
The state believes that the issues have been adequately 
presented in the briefs and that oral argument would not aid in 
the decision making process. To the extent this Court reaches 
10
 Since this appeal was filed, the juvenile court has set 
yet another hearing for petitioners to argue for custody. 
18 
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the issue of the purpose of a shelter hearing, the state believes 
that a published opinion would be beneficial to clarify the 
purpose of the shelter hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners have asked this Court to provide them with 
extraordinary relief by requiring the juvenile court to hold a 
shelter hearing on the "removal" of C.K. A shelter hearing is 
not the appropriate type of hearing because the only reason to 
hold a shelter hearing is to review the state's unilateral 
decision to take a child into protective custody. This never 
occurred with respect to C.K. 
All that petitioners are entitled to is that which they 
have already received, a hearing during which their rights and 
interests are considered. The juvenile court went out of its way 
to assure that petitioners were treated fairly and they were 
given ample opportunity to have their position considered. The 
juvenile court determined that it would not be in C.K.'s best 
interests to remain with either of petitioners and petitioners 
have not shown that this determination was erroneous. 
Accordingly the state respectfully requests that this petition be 
dismissed. _ 
DATED this „/ J day of September, 1998 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
^ ^ ^ ~ 
^^JOHN PETERSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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or district attorney's office shall coordinate with the attorney 
general's office. 
(2) Law enforcement personnel, Division of Child and Fam-
ily Services personnel, the appointed guardian ad litem, 
pretrial services personnel, and corrections personnel shall 
make reasonable efforts to facilitate the coordination required 
by this section. 
(3) Members of interdisciplinary child protection teams, 
established under Section 62A-4a-409, may participate in the 
coordination required by this section. 1996 
PART 3 A 
MINORS IN CUSTODY ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN 
ABUSE OR NEGLECT 
78-3a-350. Separate procedures for minors committed 
to the Division of Child and Family Services 
on grounds other than abuse or neglect. 
(1) The processes and procedures described in Part 3, 
Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings, designed to 
meet the needs of minors who are abused or neglected, are not 
applicable to a minor who is committed to the custody of the 
Division of Child and Family Services on a basis other than 
abuse or neglect and who are classified in the division's 
management information system as having been placed in 
custody primarily on the basis of delinquent behavior or a 
status offense. 
(2) The procedures described in Subsection 78-3a-119(2)(a) 
are applicable to the minors described in Subsection (1). 
(3) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent 
the interests of a minor described in Subsection (1). 1997 
PART 4 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ACT 
78-3a-401. Title. 
This part shall be known as the "Termination of Parental 
Rights Act." 1994 
78-3a-402. Judicial process for termination — Parent 
unfit or incompetent — Best interest of child. 
(1) This part provides a judicial process for voluntary and 
involuntary severance of the parent-child relationship, de-
signed to safeguard the rights and interests of all parties 
concerned and promote their welfare and that of the state. 
(2) Wherever possible family life should be strengthened 
and preserved, but if a parent is found, by reason of his 
conduct or condition, to be unfit or incompetent based upon 
any ofthe grounds for termination described in this part, the 
court shall then consider the welfare and best interest of the 
child of paramount importance in determining whether termi-
nation of parental rights shall be ordered. 1994 
78-3a-403. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Division" means the Division of Child and Family 
Services within the Department of Human Services. 
(2) "Failure of parental adjustment" means that a par-
ent or parents are unable or unwilling within a reason-
able time to substantially correct the circumstances, con-
duct, or conditions that led to placement of their child 
outside of their home, notwithstanding reasonable and 
appropriate efforts made by the Division of Child and 
Family Services to return the child to that home. 
(3) "Plan" means a written agreement between the 
parents of a child, who has been removed from his home 
by the juvenile court, and the Division of Child and 
Family Services or written conditions and obligations 
that have a primary objective of reuniting the family or, if 
the parents neglect or refuse to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the case plan, freeing the child for adoption. 
1996 
78-3a-404. Petition — Who may file. 
(1) Any interested party, including a foster parent, may file 
a petition for termination ofthe parent-child relationship with 
regard to a child. 
(2) The attorney general shall file a petition for termination 
of parental rights under this part on behalf of the division. 
1997 
78-3a-405. Contents of petition. 
(1) The petition for termination of parental rights shall 
include, to the best information or belief of the petitioner: 
(a) the name and place of residence of the petitioner; 
(b) the name, sex, date and place of birth, and resi-
dence of the child; 
(c) the relationship of the petitioner to the child; 
(d) the names, addresses, and dates of birth of the 
parents, if known; 
(e) the name and address of the person having legal 
custody or guardianship, or acting in loco parentis to the 
child, or the organization or agency having legal custody 
or providing care for the child; 
(f) the grounds on which termination of parental rights 
is sought, in accordance with Section 78-3a-407; and 
(g) the names and addresses of the persons or the 
authorized agency to whom legal custody or guardianship 
of the child might be transferred. 
(2) A copy of any relinquishment or consent, if any, previ-
ously executed by the parent or parents shall be attached to 
the petition. 1994 
78-3a-406. Notice — Nature of proceedings . 
(1) After a petition for termination of parental rights has 
been filed, notice of that fact and of the time and place of the 
hearing shall be provided, in accordance with the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, to the parents, the guardian, the person or 
agency having legal custody of the child, and to any person 
acting in loco parentis to the child. 
(2) A hearing shall be held specifically on the question of 
termination of parental rights no sooner than ten days &1&er 
service of summons is complete. A verbatim record of the 
proceedings shall be taken and the parties shall be advised of 
their right to counsel. The summons shall contain a statement 
to the effect that the rights of the parent or parents are 
proposed to be permanently terminated in the proceedings. 
That statement may be contained in the summons originally 
issued in the proceeding or in a separate summons subse-
quently issued. 
(3) The proceedings are civil in nature and are governed by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall in all cases 
require the petitioner to establish the facts by clear and 
convincing evidence, and shall give full and careful consider-
ation to all of the evidence presented with regard to the 
constitutional rights and claims ofthe parent and, if a parent 
is found, by reason of his conduct or condition, to be unfit or 
incompetent based upon any of the grounds for termination 
described in this part, the court shall then consider the 
welfare and best interest ofthe child of paramount importance 
in determining whether termination of parental rights shall 
be ordered. 
(4) Any hearing held pursuant to this part shall be held in 
closed court without admittance of any person who is not 
necessary to the action or proceeding, unless the court deter-
mines that holding the hearing in open court will not be 
J^wittflntal +rt +h«a oY*i\A 1994 
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78-3a-407. Grounds for termination of parental rights. 
The court may terminate all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if it finds any one of the following: 
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the 
child; 
(2) that the parent or parents have neglected or abused 
the child; 
(3) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent; 
(4) that the child is being cared for in an out-of-home 
placement under the supervision of the court or the 
division, that the division or other responsible agency has 
made a diligent effort to provide appropriate services and 
the parent has substantially neglected, wilfully refused, 
or has been unable or unwilling to remedy the circum-
stances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home 
placement, and there is a substantial likelihood that the 
parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effec-
tive parental care in the near future; 
(5) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in this 
chapter; 
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the 
parent or parents: 
(a) to support or communicate with the child; 
(b) to prevent neglect of the child; 
(c) to eliminate the risk of serious physical, men-
tal, or emotional abuse of the child; or 
(d) to avoid being an unfit parent; 
(7) the parent or parents have voluntarily relinquished 
their parental rights to the child, and the court finds that 
termination is in the child's best interest; or 
(8) the parent or parents, after a period of trial during 
which the child was returned to live in his own home, 
substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused or 
failed to give the child proper parental care and protec-
tion. 1994 
78-3a-408. Evidence of grounds for termination. 
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have aban-
doned a child, it is prima facie evidence of abandonment that 
the parent or parents: 
(a) although having legal custody of the child, have 
surrendered physical custody of the child, and for a period 
of six months following the surrender have not manifested 
to the child or to the person having the physical custody of 
the child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to 
make arrangements for the care of the child; 
(b) have failed to communicate with the child by mail, 
telephone, or otherwise for six months; or 
(c) failed to have shown the normal interest of a natu-
ral parent, without just cause. 
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are unfit or 
have neglected a child the court shall consider, but is not 
limited to, the following conditions: 
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental defi-
ciency of the parent that renders him unable to care for 
the immediate and continuing physical or emotional 
needs of the child for extended periods of time; 
(b) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally, 
or sexually cruel or abusive nature; 
(c) habitual or excessive use of intoxicating liquors, 
controlled substances, or dangerous drugs that render the 
parent unable to care for the child; 
(d) repeated or continuous failure to provide the child 
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, or other 
care necessary for his physical, mental, and emotional 
health and development by a parent or parents who are 
capable of providing that care. However, a parent who, 
legitimately practicing his religious beliefs, does not pro-
vide specified medical treatment for a child is not for that 
reason alone a negligent or unfit parent; 
(e) with regard to a child who is in the custody of the 
division, if the parent is incarcerated as a result of 
conviction of a felony, and the sentence is of such length 
that the child will be deprived of a normal home for more 
than one year; or 
(f) a history of violent behavior. 
(3) If a child has been placed in the custody of the division 
and the parent or parents fail to comply substantially with the 
terms and conditions of a plan within six months after the 
date on which the child was placed or the plan was com-
menced, whichever occurs later, that failure to comply is 
evidence of failure of parental adjustment. 
(4) The following circumstances constitute prima facie evi-
dence of unfitness: 
(a) sexual abuse, injury, or death of a sibling of the 
child due to known or substantiated abuse or neglect by 
the parent or parents; 
(b) conviction of a felony, if the facts of the crime are of 
such a nature as to indicate the unfitness of the parent to 
provide adequate care to the extent necessary for the 
child's physical, mental, or emotional health and develop-
ment; or 
(c) a single incident of life-threatening or gravely dis-
abling injury to or disfigurement of the child. 1997 
78-3a-409. Specific considerat ions where child i s not 
in physical custody of parent. 
(1) If a child is not in the physical custody of the parent or 
parents, the court, in determining whether parental rights 
should be terminated shall consider, but is not limited to, the 
following: 
(a) the physical, mental, or emotional condition and 
needs of the child and his desires regarding the termina-
tion, if the court determines he is of sufficient capacity to 
express his desires; and 
(b) the effort the parent or parents have made to adjust 
their circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in 
the child's best interest to return him to his home after a 
reasonable length of time, including but not limited to: 
(i) payment of a reasonable portion of substitute 
physical care and maintenance, if financially able; 
(ii) maintenance of regular visitation or other con-
tact with the child that was designed and carried out 
in a plan to reunite the child with the parent or 
parents; and 
(iii) maintenance of regular contact and communi-
cation with the custodian of the child. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court shall disregard 
incident**! conduct, contributions, contacts, and communica-
tions. 1997 
78-3a-410. Specific cons iderat ions where a chi ld h a s 
b e e n p laced i n foster home. 
If a child is in the custody of the division and has been 
placed and resides in a foster home and the division institutes 
proceedings under this par t regarding the child, with an 
ultimate goal of having the child's foster parent or parents 
adopt him, the court shall consider whether the child has 
become integrated into the foster family to the extent that his 
familial identity is with tha t family, and whether the foster 
family is able and willing permanently to treat the child as a 
member of the family. The court shall also consider, but is not 
limited to, the following: 
(1) the love, affection, and other emotional ties existing 
between the child and the parents, and the child's ties 
with the foster family; 
(2) the capacity and disposition of the child's parents 
from whom the child was removed as compared with that 
of the foster family to give the child love, affection, and 
guidance and to continue the education of the child: 
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N 
(3) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, 
satisfactory foster home and the desirability of his con-
tinuing to live in that environment; 
(4) the permanence as a family unit of the foster 
family; and 
(5) any other factor considered by the court to be 
relevant to a particular placement of a child. 1984 
78-3a-411. Court disposit ion of child upon termina-
tion. 
(1) Upon entry of an order under this part the court may: 
(a) place the child in the legal custody and guardian-
ship of a licensed child placement agency or the division 
for adoption; or 
(b) make any other disposition of the child authorized 
under Section 78-3a-118. 
(2) All adoptable children shall be placed for adoption. 
1997 
78-3a-412. Review following termination. 
(1) At the conclusion of the hearing in which the court 
orders termination of the parent-child relationship, the court 
shall order that a review hearing be held within 90 days 
following the date of termination if the child has not been 
permanently placed. 
(2) At that review hearing, the agency or individual vested 
with custody of the child shall report to the court regarding 
the plan for permanent placement of the child. The guardian 
ad litem shall submit to the court a written report with 
recommendations, based on an independent investigation, for 
disposition meeting the best interests of the child. 
(3) The court may order the agency or individual vested 
with custody of the child to report, at appropriate intervals, on 
the status of the child until the plan for permanent placement 
of the child has been accomplished. 1994 
78-3a-413. Effect of decree. 
<X) An order for the termination of the parent-child legal 
relationship divests the child and the parents of all legal 
rights, powers, immunities, duties, and obligations with re-
spect to each other, except the right of the child to inherit from 
the parent. 
(2) An order or decree entered pursuant to this part may 
not disentitle a child to any benefit due him from any third 
person, including, but not limited to, any Indian tribe, agency, 
state, or the United States. 
(3) After the termination of a parent-child legal relation-
ship, the former parent is neither entitled to any notice of 
proceedings for the adoption of the child nor has any right to 
object to the adoption or to participate in any other placement 
proceedings. 1994 
78-3a-414. Voluntary rel inquishment — Irrevocable. 
(1) Voluntary relinquishment or consent for termination of 
parental rights shall be signed or confirmed under oath before 
a judge of any court that has jurisdiction over proceedings for 
termination of parental rights in this state or any other state, 
or a public officer appointed by that court for the purpose of 
taking consents or relinquishments. 
(2) The court or appointed officer shall certify that the 
person executing the consent or relinquishment has read and 
understands the consent or relinquishment and has signed it 
freely and voluntarily. 
(3) A voluntary relinquishment or consent for termination 
of parental rights is effective when it is signed and may not be 
revoked. 
(4) The requirements and processes described in Sections 
78-3a-402 through 78-3a-410 do not apply to a voluntary 
relinquishment or consent for termination of parental rights. 
The court need only find tha t the relinquishment or termina-
tion is in the child's best interest. 
(5) Upon granting a voluntary relinquishment the court 
may make orders relating to the child's care and welfare that 
the court deems to be in the child's best interest. 1994 
PART 5 
DELINQUENCY AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS 
78-3a-501. Criminal proceedings involving minors — 
Transfer to juveni le c o u r t — Exception. 
(1) If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal 
proceeding in another court, including a preliminary hearing, 
it is determined that the person charged is under 21 years of 
age and was less than 18 years of age at the time of commit-
ting the alleged offense, that court shall transfer the case to 
the juvenile court, together with all the papers, documents, 
and transcripts of any testimony except as provided in Sec-
tions 78-3a-602 and 78-3a-603. 
(2) The court making the transfer shall order the person to 
be taken immediately to the juvenile court or to a place of 
detention designated by the juvenile court, or shall release 
him to the custody of his parent or guardian or other person 
legally responsible for him, to be brought before the juvenile 
court at a time designated by it. The juvenile court shall then 
proceed as provided in this chapter. 1996 
78-3a-502. Petition — Preliminary inquiry — Nonjudi-
cial adjustments — Formal referral — Cita-
tion — Failure to appear. 
(1) Proceedings in minor's cases are commenced by petition. 
(2) (a) A peace officer or any public official of the state, any 
county, city, or town charged with the enforcement of the 
laws of the state or local jurisdiction shall file a formal 
referral with the juvenile court within ten days of the 
minor's arrest. If the arrested minor is taken to a deten-
tion facility, the formal referral shall be filed with the 
juvenile court within 72 hours, excluding weekends and 
holidays. There shall be no requirement to file a formal 
referral with the juvenile court on an offense that would 
be a class B misdemeanor or less if committed by an adult. 
(b) When the court is informed by a peace officer or 
other person that a minor is or appears to be within the 
court's jurisdiction, the probation department shall make 
a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the interests 
of the public or of the minor require that further action be 
taken. 
(c) Based on the preliminary inquiry, the court may 
authorize the filing of or request that the county attorney 
or district attorney as provided under Sections 17-18-1 
and 17-18-1.7 file a petition. In its discretion, the court 
may, through its probation department, enter into a 
written consent agreement with the minor and the mi-
nor's parent, guardian, or custodian for the nonjudicial 
adjustment of the case if the facts are admitted and 
establish prima facie jurisdiction. Efforts to effect a non-
judicial adjustment may not extend for a period of more 
than two months without leave of a judge of the court, 
who may extend the period for an additional two months. 
The probation department may not in connection with 
any nonjudicial adjustment compel any person to appear 
at any conference, produce any papers, or visit any place. 
(d) The nonjudicial adjustment of a case may include 
conditions agreed upon as part of the nonjudicial closure: 
(i) payment of a financial penalty of not more than 
$100 to the Juvenile Court; 
(ii) payment of victim restitution; 
(iii) satisfactory completion of community service; 
(iv) referral to an appropriate provider for counsel-
ing or treatment; Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Section 
78-3a-316.1. Proceedings arising from failure to attend pub-
lic school. 
78-3a-317. Repealed. 
78-3a-318. Treatment for offender and victim — Costs. 
78-3a-319. Abuse, neglect, or dependency of child — Co-
ordination of proceedings. 
Part3A 
Minors In Custody on Grounds Other Than Abuse or 
Neglect 
78~3a-350. Separate procedures for minors committed to 
the Division of Child and Family Services on 
grounds other than abuse or neglect. 
Part 4 
Termination of Parental Rights Act 
78-3a-401. Title. 
78-3a-402. Judicial process for termination — Parent un-
fit or incompetent — Best interest of child. 
78-3a-403. Definitions. 
78-3a-404. Petition — Who may file. 
78-3a-405. Contents of petition. 
78-3a-406. Notice — Nature of proceedings. 
78-3a-407. Grounds for termination of parental rights. 
78-3a-408. Evidence of grounds for termination. 
78-3a-409. Specific considerations where child is not in 
physical custody of parent. 
78-3a-410. Specific considerations where a child has been 
placed in foster home. 
78-3a-411. Court disposition of child upon termination. 
78-3a-412. Review following termination. 
78-3a-413. Effect of decree. 
78-3a-414. Voluntary relinquishment — Irrevocable. 
Part 5 
Delinquency and Criminal Actions 
78-3a-
78-3* 
78-3a-
78-3a-
78-3a 
78-3a 
78-3a 
r501 
i-502. 
503. 
504. 
505. 
506. 
Criminal proceedings involving minors — 
Transfer to juvenile court — Exception. 
Petition — Preliminary inquiry — Nonjudicial 
adjustments — Formal referral — Citation 
— Failure to appear. 
Citation procedure — Citation — Offenses — 
Time limits — Failure to appear. 
Minor held in detention — Credit for good 
behavior. 
Dispositional report required in minor's cases 
— Exceptions. 
Suspension of license for certain offenses. 
507 to 78-3a-521. Renumbered as §§ 78-3a-112 to 78-3a-
121, 78-3a-913, 78-3a-914. 
Part 6 
Transfer of Jurisdiction 
78-3a-601. Jurisdiction of district court. 
78-3a-602. Serious youth offender — Procedure. 
78-3a-603. Certification hearings — Juvenile court to hold 
preliminary hearing — Factors considered 
by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to 
district court. 
Part 8 
Adult Offenses 
78-3a-801. Jurisdiction of adults for offenses acrainst mi-
Section 
nors — Proof of delinquency not required for 
conviction. ^ 
78-3a-802. Penalty — Fines — Suspension of sentence on 
condition — Bond. 
78-3a-803. Practice and procedure — Jury trial — Crimi-
nal Code prosecution unaffected. » 
78-3a-804. Costs and expenses of trial. 
Part9 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
•*\ 
78-3a-901. Violation of order of court — Contempt —" 
Penalty. •*" 
78-3a-902. Amendment of petition — When authorized — 
Continuance of proceedings. ^ 
78-3a-903. Modification or termination of custody order or 
decree — Grounds — Procedure. 
78-3a-904. When photographs, fingerprints, or HTV infec-
tion tests may be taken — Distribution — 
Expungement. 
78-3a-905. Expungement of juvenile court record —- Peti-
tion — Procedure. 
78-3a-906. Support and expenses of minor in custody of 
individual or institution — Order for pay-
ment by parent or other person authorized 
— Payments to nongovernmental agency 
vested with legal custody. 
78-3a-907. Transfer of continuing jurisdiction to other 
district. 
78-3a-908. New hearings authorized — Grounds and pro-
cedure. 
78-3a-909. Appeals. 
78-3a-910. Cooperation of political subdivisions and pub-
lic or private agencies and organizations. 
78-3a-911. Office of Guardian Ad Litem Director. 
78-3a-912. Appointment of attorney guardian ad litem — 
Duties and responsibilities — Training — 
Trained staff and court appointed special 
advocate volunteers — Costs — Immunity. 
78-3a-913. Right to counsel — Appointment of counsel for 
indigent — Cost — Court hearing to deter-
mine compelling reason to appoint a 
noncontracting attorney — Rate of pay. 
78-3a-914. Exchange of information with agency or insti-
tution having legal custody — Transfer of 
minor to state prison or other adult facility 
prohibited. -...«* 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
78-3a-l to 78-3a-65. Repealed.
 ;, ' 1996 
78-3a-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Juvenile Court Act of 1996." 
1996 
78-3a-102. Establishment of juvenile court — Organi-
zation and status of court — Purpose. 
(1) There is established for the state a juvenile court. 
(2) The juvenile court is a court of record. It shall have a 
seal, and its judges, clerks, and referees have the power to 
administer oaths and affirmations. 
(3) The juvenile court is of equal status with the district 
courts of the state. 
(4) The juvenile court is established as a forum for the 
resolution of all matters properly brought before it, consistent 
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with applicable constitutional and statutory requirements of 
due process. 
(5) The purpose of the court under this chapter is to: 
(a) promote public safety and individual accountability 
by the imposition of appropriate sanctions on persons who 
have committed acts in violation of law; 
(b) order appropriate measures to promote guidance 
and control, preferably in the minor's own home, as an aid 
in the prevention of future unlawful conduct and the 
development of responsible citizenship; 
(c) where appropriate, order rehabilitation, reeduca-
tion, and treatment for persons who have committed acts 
bringing them within the court's jurisdiction; 
(d) adjudicate matters that relate to minors who are 
beyond parental or adult control and to establish appro-
priate authority over these minors by means of placement 
and control orders; 
(e) adjudicate matters that relate to abused, neglected, 
and dependent minors and to provide care and protection 
for these minors by placement, protection, and custody 
orders; 
(f) remove a minor from parental custody only where 
the minor's safety or welfare, or the public safety, may not 
otherwise be adequately safeguarded; and 
(g) consistent with the ends of justice, strive to act in 
the best interests of the minor's in all cases and attempt 
to preserve and strengthen family ties where possible. 
1997 
78-3a-103. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Abused child" includes a minor less than 18 years 
'of age who has suffered or been threatened with 
nonaccidental physical or mental harm, negligent treat-
ment, sexual exploitation, or who has been the victim of 
any sexual abuse. 
(b) "Adjudication" means a finding by the court, incor-
porated in a decree, that the facts alleged in the petition 
have been proved. 
(c) "Adult" means a person 18 years of age or over, 
except that persons 18 years or over under the continuing 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 
78-3a-121 shall be referred to as minors. 
(d) "Board" means the Board of Juvenile Court Judges. 
(e) "Child placement agency" means: 
(i) a private agency licensed to receive minors for 
placement or adoption under this code; or 
(ii) a private agency receiving minors for place-
ment or adoption in another state, which agency is 
licensed or approved where such license or approval 
is required by law. 
(f) "Commit" means to transfer legal custody. 
(g) "Court" means the juvenile court. 
(h) "Dependent child" includes a minor who is homeless 
or without proper care through no fault of his parent, 
guardian, or custodian. 
(i) "Deprivation of custody* means transfer of legal 
custody by the court from a parent or the parents or a 
previous legal custodian to another person, agency, or 
institution. 
(j) "Detention" means home detention and secure de-
tention as defined in Section 62A-7-101 for the temporary 
care of minors who require secure custody in physically 
restricting facilities: 
(i) pending court disposition or transfer to another 
jurisdiction; or 
(ii) while under the continuing jurisdiction of the 
court. 
(k) "Formal referral" means a written report from a 
peace officer or other person informing the court that a 
minor is or appears to be within the court's jurisdictio^-
and that a petition may be filed. 
(1) "Group rehabilitation therapy" means psychological 
and social counseling of one or more persons in the group, 
depending upon the recommendation of the therapist. 
(m) "Guardianship of the person" includes the author-
ity to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the armed 
forces, to major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treat-
ment, and to legal custody, illegal custody is not vested in 
another person, agency, or institution. 
(n) "Legal custody" means a relationship embodying 
the following rights and duties: 
(i) the right to physical custody of the minor; 
(ii) the right and duty to protect, train, and disci-
pline the minor; 
(iii) the duty to provide the minor with food, cloth-
ing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care; 
(iv) the right to determine where and with whom 
the minor shall live; and 
(v) the right, in an emergency, to authorize surgery 
or other extraordinary care, 
(o) "Minor" means a person under the age of 18 years. 
It includes the term "child" as used in other parts of this 
chapter. 
(p) "Natural parent" means a minor's biological or 
adoptive parent, and includes the minor's noncustodial 
parent. 
(q) (i) "Neglected child" means a minor: 
(A) whose parent, guardian, or custodian has 
abandoned or subjected the minor to mistreat-
ment or abuse; 
(B) who lacks proper parental care by reason 
of the fault or habits of the parent, guardian, or 
custodian; 
(C) whose parent, guardian, or custodian fails 
or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsis-
tence, education, or medical care, including sur-
gery or psychiatric services when required, or 
any other care necessary for health, safety, mor-
als, or well-being; or 
(D) who is at risk of being a neglected or 
abused child as defined in this chapter because 
another minor in the same home is a neglected or 
abused child as defined in this chapter. 
(ii) The aspect of neglect related to education, 
described in Subsection (lXqXiXC), means that, after 
receiving notice that a minor has been frequently 
absent from school without good cause, or that the 
minor has failed to cooperate with school authorities 
in a reasonable manner, a parent or guardian fails to 
make a good faith effort to ensure that the minor 
receives an appropriate education. 
(iii) A parent or guardian legitimately practicing 
religious beliefs and who, for that reason, does not 
provide specified medical treatment for a minor, is 
not guilty of neglect, 
(r) "Nonjudicial adjustment" means closure of the case 
by the assigned probation officer without judicial deter-
mination upon the consent in writing of the minor, the 
parent, legal guardian or custodian, and the assigned 
probation officer. 
(s) "Probation" means a legal status created by court 
order following an adjudication on the ground of a viola-
tion of law or under Section 78-3a-104, whereby the minor 
is permitted to remain in his home under prescribed 
conditions and under supervision by the probation depart-
ment or other agency designated by the court, subject to 
return to the court for violation of any of the conditions 
prescribed. 
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~4£» (t) "Protective supervision" means a legal status cre-
* ated by court order following an adjudication on the 
ground of abuse, neglect, or dependency, whereby the 
minor is permitted to remain in his home, and supervision 
and assistance to correct the abuse, neglect, or depen-
dency is provided by the probation department or other 
agency designated by the court. 
(u) "Residual parental rights and duties* means those 
rights and duties remaining with the parent after legal 
custody or guardianship, or both, have been vested in 
another person or agency, including the responsibility for 
support, the right to consent to adoption, the right to 
determine the child's religious affiliation, and the right to 
reasonable visitation unless restricted by the court. If no 
guardian has been appointed, "residual parental rights 
and duties" also include the right to consent to marriage, 
to enlistment, and to major medical, surgical, or psychi-
atric treatment. 
(v) "Secure facility" means any facility operated by or 
under contract with the Division of Youth Corrections, 
that provides 24-hour supervision and confinement for 
youth offenders committed to the division for custody and 
rehabilitation. 
(w) "Shelter" means the temporary care of minors in 
physically unrestricted facilities pending court disposi-
tion or transfer to another jurisdiction. 
(x) "Termination of parental rights" means the perma-
nent elimination of all parental rights and duties, includ-
ing residual parental rights and duties, by court order. 
(y) Therapis t" means a person employed by a state 
division or agency for the purpose of conducting psycho-
logical treatment and counseling of a minor in its custody, 
or any other person licensed or approved by the state for 
the purpose of conducting psychological treatment and 
counseling. 
(2) As used in Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency 
Proceedings, with regard to the Division of Child and Family 
Services: 
(a) "Custody" means the custody of a minor in the 
Division of Child and Family Services as of the date of 
disposition. 
(b) "Protective custody" means the shelter of a minor by 
the Division of Child and Family Services from the time 
the minor is removed from home until the shelter hearing, 
or the minor's return home, whichever occurs earlier. 
(c) "Temporary custody" means the custody of a minor 
in the Division of Child and Family Services from the date 
of the shelter hearing until disposition. 
(3) In determining whether a minor is neglected or abused, 
as defined in this section, it may be presumed tha t the person 
having the minor under his direct and exclusive care and 
control at the time of the abuse is responsible for the neglect 
or abuse. 1997 
78-3a-104. Jurisdict ion of juveni l e court — Original — 
Exclusive. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court 
has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning: 
(a) a minor who has violated any federal, state, or local 
law or municipal ordinance or a person younger than 21 
years of age who has violated any law or ordinance before 
becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the viola-
tion occurred, excluding traffic laws and ordinances; 
(b) a person 21 years of age or older who has failed or 
refused to comply with an order of the juvenile court to 
pay a fine or restitution, if the order was imposed prior to 
the person's 21st birthday; however, the continuing juris-
diction is limited to causing compliance with existing 
orders; 
(c) a minor who is abused, neglected, or dependent, as 
those terms are defined in Section 78-3a-103; 
(d) the determination of the custody of a minor or to 
appoint a guardian of the person or other guardian of a 
minor who comes within the court's jurisdiction under 
other provisions of this section; 
(e) the termination of the legal parent-child relation-
ship in accordance with Part 4, Termination of Parental 
Rights Act, including termination of residual parental 
rights and duties; 
(f) the t reatment or commitment of a mentally re-
tarded minor; 
(g) a minor who, in defiance of earnest and persistent 
efforts on the part of his parents and school authorities as 
required under Section 53A-11-103, is a habitual truant 
from school; 
(h) the judicial consent to the marriage of a minor 
under age 16 upon a determination of voluntariness or 
where otherwise required by law, employment, or enlist-
ment of a minor when consent is required by law; 
(i) any parent or parents of a minor committed to a 
secure youth corrections facility, to order, at the discretion 
of the court and on the recommendation of a secure youth 
corrections facility, the parent or parents of a minor 
committed to a secure youth corrections facility for a 
custodial term, to undergo group rehabilitation therapy 
under the direction of a secure youth corrections facility 
therapist, who has supervision of that "parent's or parents' 
minor, or any other therapist the court may direct, for a 
period directed by the court as recommended by a secure 
youth corrections facility; 
(j) a minor under Title 55, Chapter 12, Interstate 
Compact on Juveniles; 
(k) the t reatment or commitment of a mentally ill child. 
The court may commit a child to the physical custody of a 
local mental health authority or to the legal custody of the 
Division of Mental Health in accordance with the proce-
dures and requirements of Title 62A, Chapter 12, Part 2A, 
Commitment of Persons Under Age 18 to Division of 
Mental Health. The court may not commit a child directly 
to the Utah State Hospital; and 
(1) the commitment of a minor in accordance with 
Section 62A-8-501. 
(2) In addition to the provisions of Subsection (lXa) the 
juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over any traffic of-
fense committed by a minor under 1§ years of age and 
concurrent jurisdiction over all other traffic offenses commit-
ted by a minor 16 years of age or older, except that the court 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the following traffic 
offenses committed by a minor under 18 years of age: 
(a) Section 76-5-207, automobile homicide; 
(b) Section 41-6-44, operating a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs; 
(c) Section 41-6-45, reckless driving; 
(d) Section 41-la-1311, unauthorized control over a 
motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer; 
(e) Section 41-la-1314, unauthorized control over a 
motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer for an extended 
period of time; and 
(f) Section 41-6-13.5, fleeing a peace officer. 
(3) The court also has jurisdiction over traffic offenses that 
are part of a single criminal episode filed in a petition that 
contains an offense over which the court has jurisdiction. 
(4) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over questions of 
custody, support, and visitation certified to it by the district 
court pursuant to Section 78-3a-105. 
(5) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over an ungovernable 
or runaway minor who is referred to it by the Division of Child 
and Familv Services or bv Dublic or Drivate agencies that 
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contract with the division to provide services to that minor 
where, despite earnest and persistent efforts by the division or 
agency, the minor has demonstrated that he: 
(a) is beyond the control of his parent, guardian, lawful 
custodian, or school authorities to the extent that his 
behavior or condition endangers his own welfare or the 
welfare of others; or 
(b) has run away from home. 
(6) This section does not restrict the right of access to the 
juvenile court by private agencies or other persons. 
(7) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of ail magistrate 
functions relative to cases arising under Section 78-3a-602. 
1997 
78-3a-105. Concurrent jurisdiction — District court 
and juvenile court. 
(1) The district court or other court has concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the juvenile court as follows: 
(a) when a person who is 18 years of age or older and 
who is under the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court under Section 78-3a-118 violates any federal, state, 
or local law or municipal ordinance; and 
(b) in adoption proceedings, when the juvenile court 
has previously entered an order terminating the rights of 
a parent, and finds that adoption is in the best interest of 
the minor. Adoption proceedings under this section shall 
be conducted in accordance with the procedures described 
in Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption. 
(2) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over petitions to 
modify a minor's birth certificate if the court otherwise has 
jurisdiction over the minor. 
(3) (a) This section does not deprive the district court of 
jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a minor, or to 
determine the support, custody, and visitation of a minor 
upon writ of habeas corpus or when the question of 
support, custody, and visitation is incidental to the deter-
mination of a cause in the district court. 
(b) However, if a petition involving the same minor is 
pending in the juvenile court or the juvenile court has 
previously acquired continuing jurisdiction over the same 
minor, the district court shall certify the question of 
support, custody, and visitation to the juvenile court for 
determination. 
(4) When a question is certified to the juvenile court under 
Subsection (3), the findings and order of the juvenile court 
judge are the order of the district court. 
(5) (a) Where a support, custody, or visitation award has 
been made by a district court in a divorce action or other 
proceeding, and the jurisdiction of the district court in the 
case is continuing, the juvenile court may acquire juris-
diction in a case involving the same minor if the minor is 
dependent, abused, neglected, or otherwise comes within 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Section 78-3a-
104. 
(b) The juvenile court may, by order, change the cus-
tody, support, and visitation rights previously ordered in 
the district court as necessary to implement the order of 
the juvenile court for the safety and welfare of the minor. 
The juvenile court order remains in effect so long as the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues. 
(6) When a copy of the findings and order of the juvenile 
court has been filed with the district court, the findings and 
order of the juvenile court are binding on the parties to the 
divorce action as though entered in the district court. 1997 
78-3a-106. Search warrants and subpoenas — Author-
ity to issue. 
(1) The court has authority to issue search warrants, sub-
poenas, or investigative subpoenas in criminal cases, delin-
quency, and abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings for 
the same purposes, in the same manner and pursuant to the 
same procedures set forth in the code of criminal procedure for 
the issuance of search warrants, subpoenas, or investigative 
subpoenas in other trial courts in the state. 
(2) (a) If it appears to the court upon an affidavit sworn to 
by a peace officer or any other person, and upon the 
examination of other witnesses, if required by the judge, 
that there is probable cause to believe that a child is being 
ill-treated by his parent, guardian, or custodian, or is 
being detained, ill-treated, or harbored against the de-
sires of his parent, guardian, or custodian, in any place 
within the jurisdiction of the court, the court may issue a 
warrant authorizing a peace officer to search for the child. 
(b) The officer making the search may enter a house or 
premises by force, if necessary, in order to remove the 
child. 
(c) The officer shall then take the child to the place of 
shelter designated by the court. 1997 
78-3a-107. Judges of juvenile court — Appointments — 
Terms. 
(1) Judges of the juvenile court shall be appointed initially 
to serve until the first general election held more than three 
years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, 
the term of office of a judge of a juvenile court is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January next following the 
date of election. 
(2) A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of 
the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed and 
qualified. 1996 
78-3a-108. Sessions of juvenile court. 
(1) In each county, regular juvenile court sessions shall be 
held at a place designated by the judge or judges of the 
juvenile court district, with the approval of the board. 
(2) Court sessions shall be held in each county when the 
presiding judge of the juvenile court directs, except that a 
judge of the district may hold court in any county within the 
district at any time, if required by the urgency of the case. 
1996 
7&.$e»109„ Title of petition mnd other court documents 
— Form and contents of petition — Order for 
temporary custody — Physical or psychologi-
cal examination of minor, parent, or guardian 
— Dismissal of petition. 
(1) The petition and all subsequent court documents in the 
proceeding shall be entitled: 
"State of Utah, in the interest of. , a person under 
18 years of age (or a person under 21 years of age)." 
(2) The petition shall be verified and statements in the 
petition may be made upon information and belief. 
(3) The petition shall be written in simple and brief lan-
guage and include the facts which bring the minor within the 
jurisdiction of the court, as provided in Section 78-3a-104. 
(4) The petition shall further state: 
(a) the name, age, and residence of the minor; 
(b) the names and residences of the minor's parents; 
(c) the name and residence of the guardian, if there is 
one; 
(d) the name and address of the nearest known rela-
tive, if no parent or guardian is known; and 
(e) the name and residence of the person having physi-
cal custody of the minor. If any of the facts required are 
not known by the petitioner, the petition shall so state. 
(5) At any time after a petition is filed, the court may make 
an order providing for temporary custody of the minor. 
(6) The court may order that a minor concerning whom a 
petition has been filed shall be examined by a physician, 
surgeon, psychiatrist, or psychologist and may place the minor Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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PERRI ANN BABALIS - #5658 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM-'#1231 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
160 East 300 South - 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-0250 
£r: G P ( ICQ", 
:yt District 
j,. l0.iii- Court 
IN AND FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in 
ORTIZ, Samantha 
ORTIZ, Jay 
KOFOD, Cori 
the interest of 
02/28/92 
04/23/93 
04/08/96 
Children under eighteen years of age 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
HEARING AND ORDER 
Case No. 918244 
918245 
920469 
Judge Beherns 
MOTION 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services, by and through 
its attorney, Perri Ann Babalis, Assistant Attorney General, and hereby motions the Court to hold 
a review hearing in this matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-307(6), to 
review whether Cori's placement with her relative continues to be in the best interest of the child. 
Specifically, the State has been informed that Cori's parents, Chastity Ortiz and Johnny Kofod, 
are currently residing in the same home with Cori and her aunt, Val Kofod. 
This matter will be heard on Thursday, September 18,1997 at 3:00 p.m. before Judge 
Behrens, 210 West 10000 South, Sandy, Utah. 
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DATED this zd-day of September, 1997. 
cc: Kristin Fadel, GAL 
Tina Porter, DCFS 
Lisa Lokken, Laherty & Assoc. 
Rilling & Assoc. 
Val Kofod, Aunt 
1043 E. Buddlea, Sandy, UT 84094 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
L*LL *lMl 
PERRI ANN BABALIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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FILED 
PERRI ANN BABAL1S - #565S !*tfJV ? 5 v#f 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM -'#1231 3rd District 
Attorney General Jwwiita Vom 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-0250 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH in the interest of, AMENDED ORDER RE: 
PERMANENCY PLAN, 
ORTIZ, SAMANTHA DOB 2/28/92 AND PLACEMENT OF 
ORTIZ, JAY DOB 4/23/93 CORI 
KOFOD,CORI DOB 4/8/96 Case No. 918244,918245 
920469 
Persons under eighteen (18) years of age. Judge Behrens 
The matters the State's Motion for a Permanency Plan Hearing, and the State's 
Motion to Review Placement, came on before the Court on October 24, 1997, before 
Judge Charles D. Behrens. Those present were Perri Ann Babalis, Assistant Attorney 
General; Kristin Fadel, Guardian Ad Litem; Tina Porter and Dorothy Pendleton, Division 
of Child and Family Services; Lisa Lokken, Attorney for Parents; Parents; Grandmother; 
Aunt; Josh Biesinger, therapist. 
I. State's Motion for Permanency Plan Hearing. 
The court received a court report from Tina Porter, Division of Child and Family 
Services, dated October 22, 1997. The court also received a court report from the 
Guardian Ad Litem, dated September 19, 1997. 
The court heard comments from the parties. Ms. Lokken then called the 
following witnesses, for purposes of cross-examination: 
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1. Tina Porter, Division of Child and Family Services. 
2. Josh Biesinger, Children's Therapist. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court made the following findings and order: 
1. The court finds that the parents understood what was required of them with 
regards to the service plans. This is supported by the fact that the parents 
made some initial progress on the specifics of the service plans. 
2. The court finds that the Division of Child and Family Services has offered 
reasonable services to the family. 
3. The court finds that the parents have partially complied with the service plans, 
but have failed to comply in some major aspects. 
4. The court finds that prima facie evidence exists that the children are at risk to 
return to the care and custody of their parents. 
5. The court orders that reunification services shall be terminated. 
6. The court orders the goal be changed to adoption. 
7. The court orders that visitation between the mother and Samantha and Jay 
shall be terminated. 
8. The court orders that visitation between the parents and Cori shall be 
supervised and at the discretion of the Division of Child and Family Services. 
9. A pre-trial on the State's Petition to Terminate Parental Rights shall be held 
on November 21, 1997 at 1:30 p.m. 
II. State's Motion to Review Placement. 
The State filed a Motion to Review Placement pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-3a-307(6). 
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The court heard comments from the parties. 
Based upon the foregoing, the court made the following findings and order: 
1. It is in the best interest of Cori to be removed from the kinship placement, Val 
Newman a.k.a. Kofod, and placed in the custody and guardianship of the 
Division of Child and Family Services. 
2. Val Newman has thirty (30) days to come forward with counsel and address 
the issue further, if so desired. 
3. If Val Newman fails to come forward within thirty days, Cori's placement 
shall become an adoptive placement. 
DATED this r9Q of November, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
CHARLESD 
Juvenile Cou 
CC: Tina Porter and Dorothy Pendleton, DCFS V j £ \ ^ .*>->! 
Kristin Fadel, GAL \ ^ C . 2 ^ / 
Lisa Lokken, Laherty & Assoc. %,< I IT N\\** 
Val Newman, Aunt ""**4m*utn^ 
1043 E. Buddlea, Sandy, UT 84094 
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f 
Dear Judge Behrens ; |sj(|y ^  
Your honor, Ifm filing for custody of Cori May Kofod.
 §V£ n 
Cori came to live with us in Sept. of 96, and we love her jf/• V 
dearly. We have worked with Cori, and have spent alot of 
time with her. We have been told many times that she is more 
advance then other 1| olds, and that it is easy to see that 
she gets plenty of love and attention. Cori has her own room, 
many toys to play with, she has a puppy and some fish, a big 
fenced yard to play in, and a little friend who lives next 
door. Cori is fed a healthy diet, our T.V. stays on the Disney 
channel all day, unless Barney is on. My daughter takes her 
to the park 2-4 times a wk., Cori is sang to at bedtime and 
read to at nap time. 
Your Honor we are good people, and a very loving and caring 
family. 
Our family doctor has included a letter, he said he would 
be glad to go to court for me to testify that Cori is well 
taken care of and happy. 
Tina Porter, the DCFS worker also said she will go to court 
on my behalf, She saw Cori almost weekly. Tina said she would 
testify that Cori was always happy, healthy and clean, and 
the house was always pleasent and clean. Tina says, she can 
not imagine Cori with anyone but me. 
I know you dont know me, all you know is what you were 
told, and you were looking out for the best interest o£ 
Cori. But were you told that my husband, Danny Newman, has 
no\ seen Samantha Ortiz for over two years, and that they 
have never been alone. That in the three years we have krvcw'n 
her that my husband has been around Samantha 3-4 hrs.. 
Did anyone tell you, that after Su7.y Bo£worth,the DCFS in-
vestigater ^&V& to my husband, she closed the case unfounded, 
and said that Samantha was very unreliable. 
Were you told she i Samantha has also accused her step-dad, 
her uncle, and her foster dad. 
1 do not know Samantha well, but I do care for her and I 
believe something has happened to her, but I do not know what. 
1 do know she has an active imagination, and sometimes its 
hard to know if she is telling what really happened or telling 
stories. After a visit with Samantha last Thanksgiving, Samantha 
told her foster mom that her parents had sex on the table 
while putting up Christmas lights. During a visit right befor 
Christmas , when Samantha saw her foster mom coming, she hid 
and started crying, she said that her daddy Donnie was mean 
to her and that he hurts her. At this time she did have a 
burn on her hand, we told Tina. Later we were told Samantha 
was fine and she Y\ad hurt herself on exercise equipment. 
Recently Samantha was checked by another docter and he said 
there is no signs of sexual abuse. 
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I do not know what I should say, what I should do, or even 
whet happens next. I've talked to a couple of lawyers, who 
assured me I would get Cori back, but they want 2000.00 to 
2500.00 as a retainer, and I do not have that kind of money. 
I called the courthouse, they told me, that I can file a 
pleading, and for custody of Cori on my own, that X had to 
state why Cori should be with me. 
WHY CORI SHOULD BE WITH ME; To begin with we are the only 
family and home she has ever known. I love her like she is my 
own daughter, I would never let anyone harm her. We have a 
good, loving, safe, and stable home for Cori. 
We went to our first visit on Oct. 30thf Cori was sad, 
whiney, and did not want to be held. Even Tina, the caseworker, 
commented on how different she seemed. It was affecting my 
sweet and loving Cori already, Cori needs to come home. We 
have had another visit the following wk., when the visit was 
over and they had to take Cori again, she cried and held her 
little CXCCVS out to me. I'm affraid I'm going to lose her trust. 
Your Honor I know you have alot of bad situations you have 
to deal with daily, and you have to make sure you are making 
the right choices, Cori home with her family is the right choice. 
I dont know what I need to do, but I will do anything 
you ask. I dont want to lose any more time, or have Cori 
become more confused, I just want her to come home. 
I will give her parents limited, supervised visits, or I 
wont let them see Cori at all if thats what you want. 
I am in hopes that this and the letters I have submitted to 
you, have put ease to any doubts or concerns you may have had 
about placing Cori with me. But if for some reason you are 
still worried, then why cant Cori be placed with her grand-
mother, Ruth Kofod,. My mom has worked with children alot, 
and has also included a couple of letters from people who 
know her. 
Cori is a very loved and wanted little girl, with two happy, 
stable homes §V\e can go to. So I beg of you to please hear 
us and let Cori come home to her family. 
'Xv c^o-v ^ ' - - ; - u , v~^ ^ ^ A ' v o u s , 
THANKS FOR YOUR TIME. 
JLusyr^ 
\ — > . i 
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FILED 
PERRl ANN BABALIS - #5658 
Assistant Attorney General ||f£8 ] £ jt^jj 
JAN GRAHAM -'#1231 | 
Attorney General 3rd District 
Attorneys for the State of Utah L Juvenile Cowt 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-0250 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH in the interest of, : ORDER RE: PLACEMENT 
OF CORI 
ORTIZ, SAMANTHA DOB 2/28/92 : 
ORTIZ, JAY DOB 4/23/93 
KOFOD, CORJ DOB 4/8/96 Case No. 918244,918245 
920469 
Persons under eighteen (18) years of age. Judge Behrens 
The matter of a hearing regarding the placement of Cori Kofod came on before 
the Court on February 13, 1998, before Judge Charles D. Behrens. Those present were 
Perri Ann Babalis, Assistant Attorney General; Kristin Fadel, Guardian Ad Litem; Tina 
Porter, Dorothy Pendleton, Brad Cook and Dave Andreason, Division of Child and 
Family Services; Ross Nakashima, Attorney for Val and Danny Newman, Val Newman, 
Aunt; Lisa Lokken, Attorney for Mother and John Kofod, Mother, John Kofod, 
Grandmother. 
Mr. Nakashima motioned the court for a continuance of the matter on the ground 
that the court should hold a shelter hearing with regards to the removal of Cori from the 
placement with her aunt and uncle. 
The court heard argument from counsel concerning Mr. Nakashima's motion. 
Based upon the above, the court made the following findings and order: 
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1. The court regards Cori's placement with Val and Danny Newman as a kinship 
placement pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-307(5). 
2. The court finds that pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-307(6), 
the court shall periodically review the kinship placement to determine whether 
the placement with the relatives continues to be in the child's best interest, 
whether the child should return home, or whether the child should be placed in 
the custody of the division. 
3. The court finds that a shelter hearing is not required under the present 
circumstances. 
4. Motion for continuance is denied. 
The court having denied Mr. Nakashima's motion for continuance, the matter 
before the court is whether the child is safe to return to the Newman home. 
The court received and accepted the following documents: 
1. Child Protective Services Kinship Care Report prepared by Brad Cook, dated 
February 6, 1998. 
2. Accepted Referral Form 741 and CPS information prepared by Dave 
Andreason, dated January 2, 1998. 
3. Court Report prepared by Tina Porter, dated February 10, 1998. 
4. 30 Day Mental Health Assessment prepared by Gail Hunt, Ph.D., dated 
February 4, 1998. 
The court heard argument from counsel. 
Based upon the foregoing, the court made the following findings and order: 
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1. Based upon the information provided to the court, the court denies the 
Newman's motion. 
2. Ttie court finds that it is in the best interest of Cori to not return to the 
Newman home. 
3. Ail previous orders shall remain in effect. 
DATED this Ifl ofFebruary 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
CHARLES b . BE 
Juvenile Court Judge \ f e v COV^v'V/ 
CC: Tina Porteriuad Dorothy Pendleton, DCFS ' 'Xi,^ J,,»>*x 
Kxistin^Eadel,^ GAL 
Lisa Lokkfia,_La&ei2y^ & Assoc. 
Ross Nakashima, Attorney for Newmans 
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rMtu 
APR ) 8 1990 
TONI MARIE SUTLIFF - #4155 
Attorney for Petitioners ^ v • 
1631 South 800 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801)817-4191 
Facsimile: (801) 817-8036 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
Val Newman and Ruth Kofod, ) PETITION 
Petitioners, ) FOR 
) EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
v. ) 
Hon. Charles D. Behrens, Judge ) Case No. 
Third District Juvenile Court, ) 
and ) 
State of Utah, Division of Child and ) 
Family Services, ) 
Respondents ) 
COME NOW Val Newman and Ruth Kofod, Petitioners, by and through 
their counsel, Toni Marie Sutliff, and pursuant to Rule 19, Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and Rule 65B(d&e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, submit this 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief to require the juvenile court and the State of 
Utah, Division of Family Services (DCFS) to provide a shelter hearing as required 
by Utah law, and to stay the adoption proceedings of the minor, C.K. until such 
shelter hearing is held. 
In support of this Petition, Petitioners allege as follows: 
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A. Parties Affected by Action 
The individuals or associations whose interests might be substantially 
affected by this action are: 
1. C.K., a minor child 
2. Val Newman, C.K/s paternal aunt 
3. Ruth Kofod, C.K/s paternal grandmother 
4. State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) 
B. Statement of Issues Presented 
1. Did the DCFS violate the provisions of Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-3a-301, 
by removing the minor, C.K., from the custody of her legal guardian, 
Petitioner, Val Newman, without substantial cause? 
2. Did the DCFS violate Petitioners' due process rights as C.K/s legal 
guardians by failing to comply with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
sec. 78-3a-306 which requires that a shelter hearing be held within 72 
hours after removal of a child from its home to substantiate the need to 
continue the child's removal? 
3. Did the juvenile court trial judge fail to comply with his judicial duties 
when he allowed the DCFS to remove C.K. from her legal guardian's 
custody and fail to conduct a shelter hearing, in violation of Utah law? 
C. Statement of Relief Sought 
Petitioners pray for the following relief from this Court: 
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1. An order requiring the DCFS and the juvenile court trial judge to hold 
a shelter hearing regarding the removal of C.K. from Val Newman's 
custody, to allow full and fair hearing on the relevant issues. 
2. An order staying the juvenile court proceedings regarding the 
adoption of C.K., in case number 920469 in the Third District Juvenile 
Court of Salt Lake County, to allow the shelter hearing to proceed. 
3. An order requiring the DCFS and the juvenile court judge to conduct 
any subsequent activity or hearing in compliance with Utah law and 
the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. 
D. Statement of Facts 
c 
1. The various players in this matter are: 
C.K. minor child, the subject of the dispute 
J.K. and Ch.K. C.K.'s natural parents 
Ruth Kofod C.K.'s paternal grandmother and J.O/s mother 
Val Newman C.K.'s paternal aunt, J.O/s sister 
S.O. and J.O. Ch.K.'s children from previous relationships 
2. On September 7,1996, DCFS personnel removed S.O. and J.O. from 
their mother's home based on an allegation of physical abuse. 
Pursuant to the State's Verified Petition, and following a shelter 
hearing, the juvenile court granted temporary custody and 
guardianship of these two minors to the DCFS. The court also ordered 
the DCFS to provide necessary services to J.K and Ch.K. with the goal 
of reuniting the two minors with their mother. 
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3. In contrast, the DCFS was never granted temporary custody and 
guardianship of C.K. Her parents, J.K. and Ch.K., voluntarily granted 
custody and guardianship of C.K. to her paternal grandparents, John 
and Ruth Kofod. 
4. On October 10,1996, the State moved to amend its Verified Petition 
regarding S.O. and J.O. to include C.K. In its motion, the State 
recognized that C.K. had been voluntarily placed with Petitioners. See 
attached Exhibit 1. 
5. By order dated November 6,1996, the juvenile court recognized John 
and Ruth Kofod as C.K/s legal guardians, and ordered the DCFS to 
provide services to C.K. and her grandparents, again with the goal of 
reunifying C.K. with her parents. See attached Exhibit 2. 
6. On March 20,1997, the juvenile court modified its previous order, on 
the State's motion, to grant custody and guardianship of C.K. to Ruth 
Kofod alone. John Kofod was given the express right to request a 
hearing to show cause why the change should not remain in effect. See 
attached Exhibit 3. 
7. On April 8,1997, again on the State's motion, the juvenile court 
modified its previous orders to grant custody and guardianship of 
C.K. to Val Newman, on the grounds that C.K. had always resided 
with Ms. Newman. See attached Exhibit 4. 
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8. On October 24,1997, the juvenile court held a hearing pursuant to the 
State's motion to review the placement plans of the three minor 
children. At that time the court ordered that C.K. be removed from her 
aunt's custody, and gave Ms. Newman 30 days to "come forward with 
counsel and address the issue further/7 See attached Exhibit 5. 
9. No shelter hearing regarding C.K/s removal from Ms. Newman's 
custody was held, as required by Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-3a-306. 
10. Ms. Newman was unable to find counsel that she could afford, but on 
November 14,1997, she filed a letter requesting that custody of C.K. be 
returned to her. See attached Exhibit 6. 
11. On February 13,1998, the juvenile court denied Ms. Newman's 
motion. See attached Exhibit 7. 
12. The State has petitioned to terminate J.K.'s and Ch.K/s parental rights 
over all three minors. Trial on that petition is set for April 20 and 21, 
1998. Assuming the parental rights are terminated, C.K. will be 
immediately eligible for adoption. 
E. Statement of Reasons Why No Other Plain, Speedy, or Adequate Remedy 
Exists, and Why Writ Should Issue 
In the normal course of juvenile court procedure, an aggrieved party may 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. In this case, however, there has been no 
final order from which to appeal. Petitioners are concerned about the juvenile 
Pago 5 of 22 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State's violation of their due process by failing to provide the statutorv shelter 
hearing. 
C.K. was removed from Ms. Newman's custody in October of 1997. At 
that time, she and Petitioner Ruth Kofod were not represented by counsel. The 
juvenile court informed them that Ms. Newman could file a petition with the 
juvenile court to review the matter, which she did. The court did not hold or 
consider a shelter hearing, as required by Utah law. In fact, the court and the 
DCFS continued to encourage Petitioners to work within the DCFS system. 
C.K.'s permanent adoption by unrelated parties is now imminent. Absent 
extraordinary relief from this Court, Petitioners will be denied the opportunity to 
hear from the DCFS and to present evidence of their own regarding whether the 
State appropriately removed C.K. from Ms. Newman's custody. Absent 
extraordinary relief from this Court, the State's infringement of Petitioners' due 
process rights regarding C.K.'s removal from custody will lead to C.K. being lost 
to her grandmother and aunt permanently without any recourse. 
F. Statement of Impracticability of Writ in District Court 
Given that the juvenile court is a department of the district courts, it is 
inappropriate to direct this petition to the Third Judicial District Court. 
Therefore, this petition is directed to the Court of Appeals, as the appropriate 
venue for review of juvenile court decision. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Hon. Kunberly 
Hornak, 917 P.2d 79 (Utah App. 1996). 
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G. Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
Petitions for extraordinary relief are equitable in nature. Sandy City v. Salt 
Lake County, 827 P.2d 227 (Utah 1992). In juvenile court we are primarily 
concerned with the best interests of the child, as balanced against the due process 
rights of the child's guardians. The Utah State Legislature has provided that 
children may be removed from their homes if there is substantial danger of 
harm. The Legislature also has protected the due process rights of the guardians, 
however, by requiring the juvenile court to hold a shelter hearing within 72 
hours after a child is removed, in order to ensure that the State has appropriate 
grounds for that removal. 
In this case, Petitioners, C.K/s legal guardians, have been stripped of their 
due process rights. The juvenile court held no shelter hearing, and C.K/s 
removal from her aunt's custody and guardianship has never been reviewed 
under the process the Utah statute contemplates. 
This memorandum makes the following points: 
• The equitable interests of C.K. in this case outweigh any possible 
inconvenience the State may suffer from the issuance of the 
extraordinary writ requested here. 
• The State is required to hold a shelter hearing to review C.K/s removal 
from Ms. Newman's custody. 
• Ms. Newman's custody of C.K. cannot be considered a kinship 
placement. 
• None of the hearings held after October, 1997 can be considered shelter 
hearings. 
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• The DCFS has violated its statutory obligation to piotect the stability of 
families in this case. 
The equitable interests of CK. in this case outweigh any possible 
inconvenience the State may suffer from the issuance of the extraordinary writ 
requested here. 
The facts are very simple in this case. The State removed C.K. from her 
legal guardian and failed to provide a shelter hearing as required by law. At that 
time, they were not represented by counsel and were unaware of the right to a 
shelter hearing. They innocently followed the juvenile court's and the DCFS's 
suggestions in an attempt to have custody of C.K. returned to them. Matters 
have now proceeded to a point where, if the Court of Appeals does not 
intervene, C.K. will be adopted by an unrelated family, without the Petitioners 
ever having the opportunity to understand and rebut any evidence the State may 
have to justify removing C.K. from Petitioners' love and care. 
It is Petitioners' ultimate goal to adopt C.K. They understand that they 
must file the appropriate papers and be found fit to do so. They should not be 
denied that opportunity, however, merely because the State did not follow its 
own law and procedures in this case. 
On the other hand, the State's valid interests in C.K.'s welfare will not be 
harmed if Petitioners are given the right to a shelter hearing. The State will 
merely be required to show at the shelter hearing that any one of the situations 
listed in section 78-3a-306(8) is present with regard to the Petitioners, something 
it must do by law anyway. 
Pa£Q 8 or 22 
Petition for Extraordinary Relict 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The State is required to hold a shelter hearing to review C.K.'s removal from 
Ms. Newman's custody. 
The DCFS and the juvenile court admit in several pleadings that C.K/s 
natural parents voluntarily gave custody and guardianship of C.K. to her 
grandmother, and eventually to her aunt. See Exhibits 1 and 2, for example. The 
State must, therefore, hold a shelter hearing upon removing C.K. from her 
grandmother and aunt. 
The importance of this point is best illustrated by looking at an analogous 
situation. In a situation where the natural parents of a child are not married or do 
not live together, the custodial parent can voluntarily transfer custody and 
guardianship of this child to the other parent. If the State believes the child is in 
danger, under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-3a-301 the State may 
remove the child from the home. Within 72 hours after the removal, however, the 
State must show that the child is indeed in danger and should not be returned to 
the current custodial parent. If the juvenile court agrees that the State has proven 
its case, custody and guardianship passes to the DCFS who is then ordered to 
find an appropriate placement for the child. 
The situation in this case is no different. C.K/s natural parents voluntarily 
gave custody and guardianship of her to a family member. The State had a right 
to remove her from that guardian, if it felt she was in danger under the 
provisions of sec. 78-3a-301. The State also had an obligation, however, to prove 
at a shelter hearing within 72 hours that C.K. was in fact in danger in her aunt's 
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custody. This it did not do, and custody of C.K. was given to the DCFS in 
violation of the statute and without any due process. 
Ms. Newman's custody of C.K. cannot be considered a kinship placement. 
The State cannot now argue that C.K. was placed with Val Newman as a 
kinship placement under Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-3a-307, and that therefore no 
shelter hearing is required upon removing C.K. from Ms. Newman's custody. 
That statute requires that the court determine at a shelter hearing upon 
removing the child from her parents whether the child should be placed with a 
noncustodial parent or another family member. 
In this case, there was no shelter hearing regarding C.K/s removal from 
her parent's home. No shelter hearing was necessary as her parents voluntarily 
gave custody to C.K/s grandparents. Since no shelter hearing was held, the State 
did not receive temporary custody or the opportunity to provide a kinship 
placement under sec. 78-3a-307. Any attempt to characterize Ms. Newman's 
custody of C.K. as a kinship placement now merely ignores the explicit 
provisions of the law. 
The juvenile court did order that the DCFS provide protective placement 
services to C.K., in his order of November 6,1996. See Exhibit 2. This provision in 
no way transforms C.K/s residence with her aunt as a kinship placement. 
Individuals are free to accept protective placement services voluntarily. In this 
case, since all parties, including the DCFS, assumed that the three minor children 
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would eventually be reunited with their parents, it in natural that C.K. receive 
the same kind of reunification services as her siblings. 
None of the hearings held after October, 1997 can be considered shelter 
hearings. 
In its February 18,1998 order, the juvenile court admits that no shelter 
hearing was held, by stating that no shelter hearing is required. 
The State cannot now correct its failure to provide a shelter hearing after 
removing C.K. from Ms. Newman's custody by characterizing any subsequent 
hearing as a "shelter hearing/' Any subsequent hearing suffers from several 
major flaws. 
First, no hearing was held within 72 hours as required by section 7873a-
306(1). The statute is clear. Under section 78-3a-306(7), the court may, for good 
cause, grant no more than one continuance of the shelter hearing, but not to 
exceed five days. 
Second, the proper notice was not given to Val Newman, as C.K.'s legal 
guardian. Section 78-3a-306(2) requires that the DCFS provide notice that 
contains very specific information: 
a) the name and address of the person to whom the notice is directed 
b) the date, time, and place of the shelter hearing 
c) the name of the minor on whose behalf a petition is being brought 
d) a concise statement regarding the allegations and code sections 
under which the proceeding has been instituted 
e) a statement that the guardian to whom notice is given, and the 
minor, are entitled to have an attorney present at the shelter hearing 
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f) a statement that the guardian is liable for the cost of support of the 
minor in the custody of the DCFS 
Even if we assume that all subsequent pleadings issued by the State 
contained the bare minimum information regarding C.K/s name and the date, 
time, and place of some type of hearing, none of the highlighted information was 
included. Petitioners cannot be considered to have received due notice that any 
hearings held after C.K/s removal from Ms. Newman's custody were shelter 
hearings. 
Third, at a shelter hearing the juvenile court must make certain very 
specific findings under sections 78-3a-306(8), (9), and (13): 
a) by the preponderance of the evidence that one or more described 
dangerous situations exists 
b) a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent 
or eliminate the need for removal and whether there are available 
services that would prevent the need for continued removal 
c) the facts on which the decision is based 
None of the court's orders in this matter after October, 1997 contain this 
vital information. This omission not only prevents any hearing from being 
considered a shelter hearing, but it also illustrates the dilemma the Petitioners 
find themselves in. Without a proper order, there is nothing to appeal. 
Section 78-3a-306(14) does provide that the juvenile court may order 
continued removal of the child regardless of any error in the initial removal or 
any lack of proper notice or other procedural requirements. The State cannot rely 
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on this provision to justify its failure to provide a shelter hearing; the provision 
only applies in the context of a shelter hearing. 
The DCFS has violated its statutory obligation to protect the stability of 
families in this case. 
The Utah statutes cited in this memorandum clearly obligate the DCFS to 
consider the due process rights of parents and legal guardians. This obligation is 
made explicit in section 78-3a-315. That section, regarding the procedural rights 
of foster families, discusses the importance of family stability, and provides 
specific due process rights to foster families in pursuit of that goal. 
Foster families are only given physical custody of the foster child, not 
legal custody or guardianship which remains in the State. How much more 
important, then, are the due process rights of legal guardians, who have more 
than mere physical custody of the child. The court and the DCFS recognized in 
several orders that first Ms. Kofod and later Ms. Newman had full legal 
guardianship over C.K. See for example the court's order on March 20,1997 
(Exhibit 3) that the change of custody and guardianship be subject to the rights of 
John Kofod. 
Yet, the State offered to the Petitioners not even the due process it would 
offer a foster family upon removing C.K. from her aunt's custody. As a result, 
C.K. has suffered unnecessary disruption of her family life. 
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WHEREFORE, Val Newman and Ruth Kofod hereby petition this Court 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) and Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 19 for an order requiring the trial court and the DCFS to provide 
proper notice of and conduct a shelter hearing regarding C.K/s removal from 
Val Newman's custody, and an order staying any adoption proceedings 
regarding C.K. pending the outcome of the shelter hearing. 
DATED this f^Khday of J | > T L ( 1997. 
Toni Marie Sutliff /{, / 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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Toni Marie Sutliff #4155 
1631 South 800 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
(801)736-5107 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The State of Utah, 
In the interest of: ] 
Cori Kofod (04/08/96), j 
a person under eighteen years ) 
of age. ) 
) Petition to Restore Custody 
Case No. 920469 
> Hon. Charles D. Behrens 
Petitioner, Val Newman, through her attorney, Toni Marie Sutliff, hereby 
petitions this Court for an order restoring custody of Cori Kofod to her. This 
Petition is based on the fact that the grounds on which Cori Kofod was removed 
from Petitioner's home are no longer present. Specifically, Petitioner has an 
approved home study, a copy of which is attached, and to the best of her 
knowledge both she and her husband, Danny Newman, have passed the Bureau 
of Criminal Identification background check and neither of them has any 
substantiated abuse referrals in the Child Abuse Registry. 
Petitioner requests that this Court set a hearing on this Petition and issue 
an order restoring custody of Cori Kofod to her. 
DATED thiscflkfc day of August, 1998. 
Toni Marie Sutliff W) 
Attorney for Petitioner ^ ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^4n\day of August, 1998, I caused to be 
mailed, first class, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Petition to Restore Custody to: 
Perri Babilis 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Elizabeth M. Knight 
Guardian ad Litem 
210 West 10000 South, 2nd Floor 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Dorothy Pendleton 
Adoption Worker 
Division of Child and Family Services 
1385 South State, Room 111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
c 
Toni Marie Sutliff (T) 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
• i 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of ! NOTICE OF HEARING 
KOFOD, Cori 4/8/96 ; 
i 
i 
A person under eighteen years of age ! 
Case No.: 920469 
Notice is hereby given that the above-entitled matter has been 
set for a pre-trial hearing on Mr. Sutliff's Petition to Restore 
Custody before Judge Charles D. Behrens, Jr., Third District 
Juvenile Court, 210 West 10000 South, Sandy Utah 84070, for the 
2bth day of September, 1998 at 10:00 a.m., and your presence is 
necessary. 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary 
communicative aids and services) during this proceeding should call 
Roy Whitehouse at 265-5911, at least three working days prior to 
the proceeding. 
Dated this 28th day of August, 1998, 
J. Keil 
Deputy Clerk 
cc: Perri Babalis, A/G 
Elizabeth Knight, GAL 
Dorothy Pendleton, DCFS 
Toni Marie Sutliff 
Attorney-at-Law 
1631 South 800 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
FILED 
SEP 0 3 1998 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
KOFOD, Cori 4/8/96 
A person under eighteen years of age 
NOTICE OF RESCHEDULED 
HEARING 
Case No,: 920469 
Notice is hereby given that due to circumstances, the above 
entitled matter previously scheduled for hearing on September 25, 
1998 at 10:00 a.m. before Judge Charles D. Behrens, Jr. in the 
above entitled Court, 210 West 10000 South, Sandy, Utah 84070-
1799. has now been rescheduled for October 5, 1998 at 10:00 a.m. 
Please make note of this necessary change and thank you for 
your cooperation* 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary 
communicative aids and services) during this proceeding should 
call Bruce Thomas at 238-7898, at least three working days prior 
to the proceeding. 
Dated September 3, 1998. 
cc: Perri Babalis, A/G 
Elizabeth Knight, GAL 
Dorothy Pendleton, DCFS 
P. J. Keil 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Toni Marie Sutliff 
Attorney-at-Law 
1631 South 800 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
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